The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power facility, the largest in Europe, with six reactors, has been under Russian control since March, 4, 2022.
The facility fell under Russian control after a harrowing overnight battle that involved large artillery and guided missiles. During that night of fighting, a perimeter building was set alight. Quite possibly, it’s not a good idea to have an armed conflict unfold around a functioning nuclear power facility.
Thirty years ago, Bennett Ramberg, my UCLA colleague at the time, warned that nuclear facilities could become targets of the enemy in a war. Today, sadly, this scenario has been realized.
At the Zaporizhzhia facility, many nuclear engineers and technicians critical for safe operation have been forced to sign employment agreements with Rosatom, the commercial Russian nuclear operator, whilst those in the control rooms toil under supervision by armed Russian soldiers.
A substantial proportion of the workforce has fled, putting a huge additional strain on those remaining. The facility’s director was briefly kidnapped (and released) by the Russian authorities.
Paradoxically, the U.S. buys enriched uranium fuel from Rosatom pumping several billion dollars annually into the Russian economy, despite the global boycott of Russian gas and oil. To quote Lord Palmerston, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
Readers will surely note the recent destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam. Critical analyses clearly indicate that Russia was responsible. Not only was there widespread downstream flooding, but maintaining a high water level in the reservoir behind the dam is critical to cooling the Zaporizhzhia nuclear reactors.
Attacks on civilian infrastructure are a common military strategy but endanger safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility as well.
Fortunately, the six reactors are in cold shutdown, but this is no reason for complacency. The spent nuclear fuel needs to be cooled. Uninterrupted supplies of water and electricity are needed, too.
The length of the shutdown means the danger of an airborne release of radioactive iodine—half-life 8 days—is over. (Radioactive iodine caused more than 7,000 thyroid cancers in children after the Chernobyl nuclear power facility accident.) This is, of course, not true of longer-lived radionuclides, some of which, like cesium, have half-lives of 30 years or even more than 400 years for americium should the containment be breached.
There are recent, albeit unconfirmed, reports of Russian soldiers placing small explosive devices on the roofs of several reactor buildings. In the context of the Russian destruction of the Kakhovka dam, this is worrisome.
Their strategy could be to make it appear that damage to the reactors was done by Ukrainian artillery fire. Fortunately, such explosives are very unlikely to breach the containment structures around each reactor, which can withstand much greater forces.
What if the Russians were to decide to blow up the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility?
This is not easily done, but let’s consider several possible scenarios.
The immediate radiological health consequences would likely be small, but there might have to be controlled evacuations, and a large surrounding area could become contaminated and uninhabitable for years.
It’s important to keep in mind that nuclear reactors, even exploding ones, are not weapons of mass destruction. They are weapons of mass disruption, which is exactly why the Russians might consider this strategy.
Now, let’s consider the second nuclear threat: nuclear weapons. These are potential weapons of mass destruction.
Again, things have gotten worse. Russia has deployed so-called tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a client state. Making matter worse is that a dreadful mercenary force, the Wagner Group, has also relocated (or been exiled) to Belarus. Who knows how secure these tactical nuclear weapons are although one hopes launch keys remain under Russian control?
And then we have an increasingly bellicose Russian president who is well aware of what happens to Russian leaders who lose a war. (Not good.) Possibly, Mr. Putin knows the line from “Hamlet,” uttered by Claudius: “Diseases desperate grown, / By desperate appliance are relieved, / Or not at all.”
This principle applies to self-inflicted diseases, such as Putin’s invasion of a neighboring state.
In sum, we have parallel worsening two nuclear threats: instability at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear facility and the escalating threat of tactical nuclear weapons.
If radiation from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility were to contaminate land in a NATO ally, the U.S. would potentially be obligated to counter as per Article 5 of the NATO treaty. One can imagine the situation spiraling out of control, with one nuclear provocation leading to another.
We are not sitting still.
Our Harvard Ukraine Nuclear Security Group has been working to consider all these scenarios, meeting with the International Atomic Agency, Energoatom, the Ukrainian operator of the facility, and representatives of the Ukraine government. But it’s impossible to imagine every contingency.
It is useful to think back to 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Newly independent Ukraine was briefly the world’s third largest nuclear country, with more nuclear weapons than Britain, France and China combined. In 1994, the U.S., U.K., and Russia (can you believe it) signed the Budapest Memorandum assuring (but not guaranteeing) the security of Ukraine in exchange for returning its nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling.
Russia had retained launch control and keeping these weapons in operational condition is hugely expensive, so it was probably a reasonable decision at the time.
One, of course, wonders if Russia would have invaded Crimea in 2014, and again a full-scale invasion in 2022, had Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapons.
What is the impact of this on calls for nuclear non-proliferation? Why would any other nuclear state relinquish its weapons for a security guarantee from the U.S., U.K., or Russia? It also incentivizes countries like Iran to develop nuclear weapons to protect their sovereignty.
I fear we are in for a rough ride all around.
